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ON THE CORE AND WALRASIAN EXPECTATIONS
EQUILIBRIUM IN INFINITE DIMENSIONAL
COMMODITY SPACES
ANUJ BHOWMIK AND JILING CAO
Abstract. In this paper, we establish two different characterizations of Wal-
rasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition in an
asymmetric information economy having finite numbers of agents and states
of nature and whose commodity space is a Banach lattice. The first one deals
with Aubin non-dominated allocations, and the other claims that an alloca-
tion is a Walrasian expectations allocation if and only if it is not privately
dominated by the grand coalition, by considering perturbations of the original
initial endowments in precise directions.
1. Introduction
The classical deterministic Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model on an economic sys-
tem consists of finitely many consumers, producers and commodities, refer to [3]
and [17]. In late of 1950’s, Arrow and Debreu introduced uncertainty into this
deterministic model by adding contingent claims, [6, Chapter 7]. In this improved
model, agents make contracts contingent on the realized state of nature known to
all the agents. However, such a model does not capture the idea of contracts un-
der asymmetric information as all agents face the same uncertainty. To overcome
this shortcoming, Radner [21] introduced economies with asymmetric information.
In Radner’s model, an economy consists of finitely many agents, each of whom is
characterized by a state dependent utility function, a random initial endowment,
a private information set and his prior belief; and agents arrange contingent con-
tracts for trading commodities before they obtain any information about the real-
ized state of nature. Analogous to the concept of a Walrasian equilibrium in the
Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model, Radner also introduced the notion of a Walrasian
expectations equilibrium for an asymmetric information economy so that the infor-
mation of an agent places a restriction on his feasible trades: better information
allows for more contingent trades, and each agent maximizes his ex ante expected
utility subject to his budget constraint with respect to his private information. This
individualistic behavior leads to a feasible redistribution of the initial endowments
for each state of nature.
In this paper, we continue the study on asymmetric information economies. In
particular, we are interested in asymmetric information economies whose commod-
ity spaces are infinite dimensional spaces. In Section 2, we give a general description
on a discrete model of an asymmetric information economy having finitely many of
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agents and states of nature, and whose commodity space is a Banach lattice. We
also associate a continuum model with this discrete model. The continuum model
has the equal treatment property. It is worth to mention that Tourky and Yannelis
[24] and Podczeck [19] constructed counterexamples of economies to show that the
classical core-Walras equivalence in [5] fails whenever the commodity space is a
non-separable ordered Banach space. In both of these two papers, the authors used
the Continuum Hypothesis in set theory to construct an economy with uncount-
ably many utility functions. Since the commodity spaces of economies in our paper
are Banach lattices which are not necessarily separable, our theorems give some
positive results for asymmetric information economies whose commodity spaces are
non-separable.
The concept of the private core of an asymmetric information economy was in-
troduced in [27]. Einy et al. [8] showed that under appropriate assumptions, the
private core coincides with the set of Walrasian expectations allocations for an
atomless economy whose commodity space is Euclidean space. Herve´s-Beloso et al.
[15] established a similar result for an equal treatment economy whose commodity
space is ℓ∞. By considering an atomless economy with asymmetric information,
Evren and Hu¨sseinov [9] extended these results to an economy whose commodity
space is an ordered separable Banach space which has an interior point in its positive
cone. In Section 3, we establish a similar equivalence result for an equal treatment
economy whose commodity space is a Banach lattice. In an atomless economy with
a complete information and a finite dimensional commodity space, improving a re-
sult of [5], Schmeidler [23] and Grodal [12] showed that (i) if some coalition blocks
an allocation, then there is also a blocking subcoalition with arbitrarily small mea-
sure; and (ii) the small coalition can be the union of at most ℓ +1 coalitions, each
of which has measure and diameter less than an arbitrary small number ǫ > 0,
where ℓ is the number of commodities. In the same issue of Econometrica, Vind
[26] extended (i) to show that if some coalition blocks then there is a blocking
coalition with any measure less than the measure of the grand coalition. The first
extension of the Schmeidler and Grodal’s results to an infinite dimensional setting
(the space ℓ∞) were obtained in [13], where it was also showed that the Vind’s
result fails in the space ℓ∞ under the standard assumptions. Herve´s-Beloso et al.
[14] first extended Vind’s theorem to an asymmetric information economy with a
continuum of agents having the equal treatment property, and whose commodity
space is Euclidean space. Later, Herve´s-Beloso et al. [15] extended Vind’s the-
orem to an asymmetric information economy with a continuum of agents having
the equal treatment property and whose commodity space is ℓ∞. All of these ex-
tension are established by using finite-dimensional Lyapunov’s convexity theorem.
Using an infinite dimensional extension of Lyapunov’s convexity theorem, Evren
and Hu¨sseinov [9] further extended Vind’s theorem to an atomless economy whose
commodity space is an ordered Banach space having an interior point in its positive
cone, with some additional assumption. Our second main result in Section 3 is an
extension of Vind’s theorem to an asymmetric information economy with the equal
treatment property, and whose commodity space is a Banach lattice.
Addressing complete information economies with finitely many agents and com-
modities, Aubin [4] introduced the ponder veto concept and showed that the core
obtained by this veto mechanism coincides with the Walrasian equilibria. Aubin’s
approach was employed by Gabriella Graziano, Meo and Herve´s-Beloso et al. to
3characterizeWalrasian expectations equilibria of asymmetric information economies.
Herve´s-Beloso et al. [14] introduced the notion of Aubin non-dominated allocations.
Gabriella Graziano andMeo [10] showed that the Aubin private core provides a com-
plete characterization of Walrasian expectations allocations in an economy with a
complete measure space of agents. They also showed that Aubin private core allo-
cations in an asymmetric information economy with a complete measure space of
agents and an ordered separable Banach space whose positive cone has an interior
point as the commodity space can be characterized by privately non-dominated al-
locations in suitable associated economies. Herve´s-Beloso et al. [14, 15] established
similar results for asymmetric information economies with finitely many agents and
states of nature, and Rℓ or ℓ∞ as the commodity space. The proof of Herve´s-Beloso
et al. was built on associated continuum economies and thus requires the validity of
Vind’s theorem, which is not the case in the proof of Gabriella Graziano and Meo
[10]. In Section 4, we adopt the approach in [14, 15] to characterize Walrasian ex-
pectations equilibria in terms of the private blocking power of the grand coalition.
Since our economic model has finitely many agents and a Banach lattice as the
commodity space, our results can be considered as extensions of those in [14, 15].
In the Appendix, an asymmetric information economy whose commodity space
is a Banach lattice and which has infinitely many states of nature is discussed.
Mathematical preliminaries and discussions on some assumptions are also provided
in the Appendix. Of course, all of these mathematical preliminaries can be found
in [1].
2. Description of the model
In this section, we describe our model of an exchange economy with asymmetric
information.
2.1. The discrete model. Our first model of an exchange economy is a discrete
model E with (fixed) n agents denoted by the set N = {1, ..., n}, like those ones
considered in [21, 22]. A measurable space (Ω,F) is used to describe the exogenous
uncertainty of E , where Ω is a finite set denoting the set of all possible states of
nature and the σ-algebra F denotes the set of all events. The commodity space
of E is a Banach lattice Y with a partial order ≤. The economy E extends over
two time periods τ = 0, 1, and consumption takes place at τ = 1. At τ = 0, there
is uncertainty over the states of nature and agents make contracts that may be
contingent on the realized state of nature at τ = 1. More precisely, E is expressed
by E = {((Ω,F), Y+,Fi, Ui, ai, qi) : i ∈ N}, where the positive cone Y+ of Y is
the consumption set in each state of nature ω ∈ Ω for every agent i ∈ N ; Fi is a
partition of Ω representing the private information of agent i; Ui : Ω× Y+ → R is
the random utility function of agent i; ai : Ω→ Y+ is the random initial endowment
of agent i, assumed to be constant on elements of Fi; and qi is a probability measure
on Ω giving the prior of agent i, assumed to be positive on all elements of Ω. For
any random consumption bundle x : Ω→ Y+, the ex ante expected utility of agent
i is given by Vi(x) =
∑
ω∈Ω Ui(ω, x(ω))qi(ω).
An assignment in E is a function x = (x1, ..., xn) which associates to every agent i
a random consumption bundle xi : Ω→ Y+, equivalently written as xi ∈ (Y+)Ω. We
call a function with domain Ω, constant on elements of Fi, Fi-measurable, although
measurability is meant with respect to the σ-algebra generated by the partition.
Put Li = {xi ∈ (Y+)
Ω : xi is Fi-measurable}. An assignment x = (x1, ..., xn) in
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E is called an allocation if xi ∈ Li for all i ∈ N. An allocation x is said to be
feasible if
∑n
i=1 xi(ω) ≤
∑n
i=1 ai(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Further, an allocation x of E
is privately dominated if there exists a feasible allocation y = (y1, ..., yn) such that
Vi(yi) > Vi(xi) for all i ∈ N . A feasible allocation x of E is called privately Pareto
optimal if it is not privately dominated. A price system is an F -measurable, non-
zero function π : Ω→ Y ∗+, where Y
∗
+ is the positive cone of the norm-dual space Y
∗
of Y . The budget set Bi(π) of agent i under π is defined as
Bi(π) =
{
xi ∈ Li :
∑
ω∈Ω
〈π(ω), xi(ω)〉 ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
〈π(ω), ai(ω)〉
}
.
Given a feasible allocation x and a price system π in E , the pair (x, π) is called a
Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E in the sense of Radner if
(2.1) for all i ∈ N , xi ∈ Bi(π) and the consumption bundle xi maximizes Vi on
Bi(π) whenever
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), ai(ω)〉 6= 0;
(2.2)
∑
ω∈Ω
〈
π(ω),
∑
i∈N xi(ω)
〉
=
∑
ω∈Ω
〈
π(ω),
∑
i∈N ai(ω)
〉
.
If
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), ai(ω)〉 6= 0 for some i ∈ N , then (x, π) is called non-trivial. Further,
if
(2.1′) for all i ∈ N , xi ∈ Bi(π) and xi maximizes Vi on Bi(π),
and (2.2) hold, (x, π) is called a Walrasian expectations equilibrium of E in the
sense of Radner, and x is called a Walrasian expectations allocation. Note that if
(x, π) is a Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium, then feasibility of x and (2.2)
together imply
(2.3)
〈
π(ω),
∑
i∈N xi(ω)
〉
=
〈
π(ω),
∑
i∈N ai(ω)
〉
for each ω ∈ Ω.
Throughout this paper, we put the following assumptions on our discrete model
E . These assumptions or some of their combinations are used in different places of
the paper.
(A1) Continuity. For each i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, Ui(ω, ·) is norm-continuous.
(A2) Monotonicity. For each i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, Ui(ω, ·) is monotone in the sense
that if x, y ∈ Y+ with y > 0, then Ui(ω, x+ y) > Ui(ω, x).
(A3) Concavity. For each i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, Ui(ω, ·) is concave.
(A4) Quasi-interiority. For each ω ∈ Ω,
∑
i∈N ai(ω)≫ 0.
(A′4) Positivity. For each ω ∈ Ω,
∑
i∈N ai(ω) > 0.
(A5) Strong positivity. For each i ∈ N , inf{ai(ω) : ω ∈ Ω} > 0.
(A6) Stability. There exists an element aˆ ∈ Y+ such that L
(∑
i∈N ai(ω)
)
= L(aˆ)
for each ω ∈ Ω.
(A7) Irreducibility. For each feasible allocation x of E and any two non-empty
disjoint subsets N1, N2 of N with N1 ∪ N2 = N , there is a y = (yi)i∈N2
such that yi ∈ Li and Vi(yi) > Vi(xi) for all i ∈ N2, and
∑
i∈N1
ai(ω) +∑
i∈N2
xi(ω) ≥
∑
i∈N2
yi(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω.
Remark 2.1. Under (A1), Vi is continuous with respect to the product topology
induced by the norm. Under (A2), Vi is monotone in the sense that if x, y ∈ (Y+)Ω
with y(ω) > 0 for some ω ∈ Ω, then Vi(x+ y) > Vi(x). Under (A3), Vi is concave.
(A6) implies that the aggregate endowments do not vary too much across states.
(A7) is similar to (A.3) in [8]. When Y = ℓ∞, assumptions (A2)-(A4) are similar to
(A.2)-(A.4) in [15]. Further, assumptions (A1)-(A4) are similar to (A.2) and (A.3)
in [10], and (A.A3)-(A.A5) in [9] (except for the convexity). 
5The following proposition, which is a modification of Proposition 3.2 in [8], shall
be used in the sequel.
Proposition 2.2. If E satisfies (A7), then every non-trivial Walrasian expectations
quasi-equilibrium of E is a Walrasian expectations equilibrium.
Proof. Let (x, π) be a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E .
Then N2 = {i ∈ N :
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), ai(ω)〉 6= 0} 6= ∅. Let N1 = N − N2. If
N2 = N , there is nothing to verify. Otherwise, N1 6= ∅. By (A7), there is a
y = (yi)i∈N2 such that yi ∈ Li and Vi(yi) > Vi(xi) for all i ∈ N2, and
∑
i∈N1
ai(ω)+∑
i∈N2
xi(ω) ≥
∑
i∈N2
yi(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Then
∑
i∈N2
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), xi(ω)〉 ≥∑
i∈N2
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), yi(ω)〉, and
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), xi(ω)〉 <
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), yi(ω)〉 for each
i ∈ N2, which is a contradiction. 
2.2. A continuum interpretation. Now, we associate a continuum economy Ec with
the discrete model E , just like that in [11] and [14, 15]. The set of agents of Ec
is the unit interval I = [0, 1] endowed with the Lebesgue measure µ. We write
I =
⋃n
i=1 Ii, where Ii =
[
i−1
n
, i
n
)
for i = 1, ..., n− 1, and In =
[
n−1
n
, 1
]
. Each agent
t ∈ Ii is characterized by the private information set Ft = Fi; the consumption set
Y+ in each state ω ∈ Ω; the random initial endowment a(t, ·) = ai; the random
utility function Ut = Ui; and the prior qt = qi. The ex ante expected utility
function of every agent t ∈ Ii is Vt = Vi. Thus, Ec can be expressed as Ec =
{((Ω,F), Y+, I,Fi, ai, Vi, qi) : i ∈ N}. We call Ii the set of type i agents, and Ec
an economy with the equal treatment property. An assignment in Ec is a function
f : I × Ω→ Y+ such that f(·, ω) ∈ L1(µ, Y+) for all ω ∈ Ω, where L1(µ, Y+) is the
set of all Bochner integrable functions from I into Y+. Put Lt = Li for each t ∈ Ii
and i ∈ N . An assignment f in Ec is called an allocation if f(t, ·) ∈ Lt for almost
all t ∈ I. An allocation f in Ec is feasible if
∫
I
f(t, ω)dµ(t) ≤
∫
I
a(t, ω)dµ(t) for all
ω ∈ Ω. A coalition in Ec is a Borel measurable subset S ⊆ I with µ(S) > 0. A
coalition S privately blocks an allocation f in Ec if there is a function g : S×Ω→ Y+
such that g(t, ·) ∈ Lt and Vt(g(t, ·)) > Vt(f(t, ·)) for all t ∈ S, and
∫
S
g(t, ω)dµ(t) ≤∫
S
a(t, ω)dµ(t) for all ω ∈ Ω. The private core of Ec is the set of all feasible
allocations which are not privately blocked by any coalition.
Given a feasible allocation f and a price system π in Ec, the budget set of an
agent t ∈ I is Bt(π) = Bi(π) if t ∈ Ii and i ∈ N . The pair (f, π) is called a
Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of Ec in the sense of Radner if
(2.4) for all t ∈ I, f(t, ·) ∈ Bt(π) and f(t, ·) maximizes Vt on Bt(π) whenever∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), a(t, ω)〉 6= 0;
(2.5)
∑
ω∈Ω
〈
π(ω),
∫
I
f(t, ω)dµ(t)
〉
=
∑
ω∈Ω
〈
π(ω),
∫
I
a(t, ω)dµ(t)
〉
.
If
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), a(t, ω)〉 6= 0 for all t in some coalition S ⊆ I, then (f, π) is called
non-trivial. Further, if
(2.4′) for all t ∈ I, f(t, ·) ∈ Bt(π) and f(t, ·) maximizes Vt on Bt(π)
and (2.5) hold, then (f, π) is called aWalrasian expectations equilibrium of Ec in the
sense of Radner, and f is called a Walrasian expectations allocation. An allocation
f in Ec can be interpreted as an allocation x in E , where xi = n
∫
Ii
f(t, ·)dµ(t) for
all i ∈ N . Conversely, an allocation x in E can be interpreted as an allocation f in
Ec, where f is the simple function given by f(t, ·) = xi for all t ∈ Ii and i ∈ N .
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Analogous to Theorem 1 in [11] and Theorem 3.1 in [14, 15], our next result
shows that the discrete and continuum approaches can be considered equivalent
with respect to Walrasian expectations (quasi-)equilibria.
Proposition 2.3. Assume that E satisfies (A3). If (x, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian
expectations quasi-equilibrium of E, then (f, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expecta-
tions quasi-equilibrium of Ec, where f(t, ·) = xi if t ∈ Ii. Conversely, if (f, π) is
a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of Ec, then (x, π) is a non-
trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E, where xi = n
∫
Ii
f(t, ·)dµ(t).
Since the proof of Proposition 2.3 is straightforward, we omit it.
Remark 2.4. A similar conclusion holds if “non-trivial Walrasian expectations
quasi-equilibrium” is replaced with “Walrasian expectations equilibrium”. 
3. Characterizations of private cores of equal treatment economies
In this section, we establish a relation between the private core and the set
of Walrasian expectations allocations in the setting of equal treatment, and give
an extension of Vind’s theorem. These two results allow us to obtain our main
theorems in Section 4.4.
3.1. Equivalence results. Evren and Hu¨sseinov [9] provided an equivalence theorem
between the private core and the set of Walrasian expectations allocations in an
economy whose commodity space is an ordered separable Banach space having an
interior point in its positive cone. Next, we give a similar result for the case that
the commodity space is a Banach lattice.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that the commodity space of E has an interior point in its
positive cone. Let f be a feasible allocation in Ec such that f(t, ·) = xi for all t ∈ Ii
and i ∈ N . Under (A1), (A2) and (A4), if f is in the private core of Ec, then (f, π)
is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of Ec for some non-zero
π : Ω→ Y ∗+.
Proof. Consider a correspondence G : I ⇒ (Y+)
Ω defined by G(t) = {g(t, ·) ∈
Lt : Vt(g(t, ·)) > Vt(f(t, ·))}. By (A2), G(t) 6= ∅ for all t ∈ I. Applying the
infinite dimensional extension of Lyapunov convexity theorem [25] to the proof of
Proposition 5 in [16, p. 62], one can show that
H = ‖ · ‖Ω-cl
(⋃{∫
A
G(t, ·)dµ(t) −
∫
A
a(t, ·)dµ(t) : A ∈ A, µ(A) > 0
})
is a convex subset of Y Ω, where A denotes the set of Lebesgue measurable subsets
of I. Since H ∩ int(−Y+)Ω = ∅, by the separation theorem, there is a non-zero
positive element π ∈ (Y ∗)Ω such that for any coalition A,∑
ω∈Ω
〈π(ω), y(ω)〉 ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
〈
π(ω),
∫
A
a(t, ω)dµ(t)
〉
for all y ∈
∫
A
G(t, ·)dµ(t). Let N1 = {i ∈ N :
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), ai(ω)〉 6= 0}. Suppose
Vi(yi) > Vi(xi) for some i ∈ N1 and yi ∈ Li. If yi ∈ Bi(π), by (A1), one can
construct some zi ∈ Bi(π) such that Vi(zi) > Vi(xi) and∑
ω∈Ω
〈
π(ω),
∫
Ii
zi(ω)dµ(t)
〉
<
∑
ω∈Ω
〈
π(ω),
∫
Ii
ai(ω)dµ(t)
〉
,
7which is a contradiction. Thus,
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), yi(ω)〉 >
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), ai(ω)〉. By (A2),∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), xi(ω)〉 ≥
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), ai(ω)〉 for all i ∈ N1. Using the feasibility of f ,
one can show that xi ∈ Bi(π) for all i ∈ N1. Thus, (x, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian
expectations quasi-equilibrium in E . By Proposition 2.3, (f, π) is a non-trivial
Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in Ec. 
Corollary 3.2. Let f be a feasible allocation such that f(t, ·) = xi for all t ∈ Ii and
i ∈ N . Under (A1), (A2), (A4) and (A7), f is a Walrasian expectations allocation
if and only if f is in the private core of Ec.
Next, we extend Theorem 3.1 to an asymmetric information economy with equal
treatment property whose commodity space is a Banach lattice containing a quasi-
interior point in its positive cone. For each i ∈ N and each xi ∈ Li, let Pi(xi) :=
{yi ∈ Li : Vi(yi) > Vi(xi)} be the set of all Fi-measurable consumption bundles
preferred to xi by agent i. Then Pi : Li ⇒ Li is called the preference relation of
agent i. Note that under (A1) and (A3), Pi(xi) is convex and relatively ‖ · ‖Ω-open
in Li for all i ∈ N . The following definition of ATY-properness is taken from [20].
Definition 3.3. The relation Pi : Li ⇒ Li is called ATY-proper at xi ∈ Li if
there exists a convex subset P˜i(xi) of Y
Ω with non-empty ‖ · ‖Ω-interior such that
P˜i(xi) ∩ Li = Pi(xi) and (‖ · ‖Ω-intP˜i(xi))∩Li 6= ∅.
(A8) Properness. If (x1, ..., xn) is a privately Pareto optimal allocation in E , then
for each i ∈ N , Pi is ATY-proper at xi.
Lemma 3.4. Let Y be a real vector space endowed with a Hausdorff, locally convex
topology τ and let U, V be convex subsets of Y such that U is open and U ∩ V 6= ∅.
Let y ∈ V ∩ clU , where clU denotes the closure of U . Suppose that π is a linear
functional (not necessarily continuous) on Y with 〈π, y〉 ≤ 〈π, y′〉 for all y′ ∈ U∩V .
Then, there exist linear functionals π1 and π2 on Y such that π1 is continuous,
〈π1, y〉 ≤ 〈π1, u〉 for all u ∈ U , 〈π2, y〉 ≤ 〈π2, v〉 for all v ∈ V and π = π1 + π2.
Lemma 3.5. Let Y be a Riesz space endowed with a Hausdorff, locally convex
topology τ . If L(z) is τ-dense in Y , then L(z)+ is τ-dense in Y+.
Lemma 3.6. Let Y be a Riesz space and let Z be an ideal in Y . Let y1, ..., ym be
elements of Y and z1, ..., zm be elements of Z such that
∑m
i=1 zi ≤
∑m
i=1 yi. Suppose
that there exists an element z ∈ Z such that z ≤ yi for each i = 1, ...,m. Then,
there are elements zˆ1, ..., zˆm of Z such that
∑m
i=1 zˆi =
∑m
i=1 zi and zˆi ≤ yi for each
i = 1, ...,m.
For proofs of Lemmas 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6, see Lemmas 2 and 3 in [18] and Lemma
7 in [20], respectively. In the proof of the next theorem, the argument to get
continuity of the equilibrium price is similar to that in Theorem 2 of [20]. Our
proof needs some additional construction because of the free disposal assumption.
Theorem 3.7. Assume that E satisfies (A1)-(A4), (A6) and (A8). Let f be a
feasible allocation in Ec such that f(t, ·) = xi for all t ∈ Ii and i ∈ N . If f is
in the private core of Ec, then (f, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-
equilibrium of Ec for some non-zero π : Ω→ Y
∗
+.
Proof. Let f be in the private core of Ec. Let Z = L(aˆ), where aˆ is selected
according to (A6). Then, (Z, ‖ · ‖aˆ) is an AM -space with aˆ as an order unit. Note
that aˆ ∈ ‖ · ‖aˆ-intZ+, Z+ is ‖ · ‖aˆ-closed in Z, and the ‖ · ‖aˆ-closed unit ball of Z
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coincides with the order interval [−aˆ, aˆ]. Define a new economy Eˆ which is identical
with E except for the commodity space being Z equipped with the ‖ · ‖aˆ-topology,
each agent’s consumption set being Z+ in each state of nature ω ∈ Ω, and agent
i’s ex ante expected utility being Vi|ZΩ . If (y1, ..., yn) is a feasible allocation of E ,
then yi(ω) ∈ Z+ for each i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω. Thus, xi(ω) ∈ Z+ for each i ∈ N and
ω ∈ Ω. Since
∑
i∈N ai(ω) is an order unit of Z,
∑
i∈N ai(ω) ∈ ‖ · ‖aˆ-intZ+ for each
ω ∈ Ω. Since (Z, ‖ · ‖aˆ) is a Banach lattice, the ‖ · ‖-topology is weaker than the
‖ · ‖aˆ-topology on Z. It follows that Ui(ω, ·)|Z is ‖ · ‖aˆ-continuous. Thus, we have
verified that Eˆ satisfies (A1), (A2) and (A4), and f is in the private core of Eˆc. By
Theorem 3.1, there is a non-zero positive element πˆ ∈ ((Z, ‖·‖aˆ)∗)Ω such that (f, πˆ)
is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in Eˆc. We need to show
that there is a non-zero positive π ∈ ((Z, ‖ · ‖)∗)Ω such that (f, π) is a non-trivial
Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in Ec|Z , where Ec|Z is identical with Eˆc
except for the commodity space being Z with the norm ‖ · ‖.
Since (f, πˆ) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in Eˆc, by
Proposition 2.3, (x1, ..., xn, πˆ) is a non-trivialWalrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium
in Eˆ . Thus, (x1, ..., xn) is a privately Pareto optimal allocation in Eˆ , and also in
E . Let i ∈ N . By (A8), there is a convex and ‖ · ‖Ω-open subset Wi of Y Ω such
that ∅ 6=Wi ∩ Li ⊆ Pi(xi) and ‖ · ‖Ω-clPi(xi) ⊆ ‖ · ‖Ω-clWi. Since
∑
i∈N ai(ω) is a
quasi-interior point of Y+ for each ω ∈ Ω, Z is ‖·‖-dense in Y . By Lemma 3.5, Z+ is
‖·‖-dense in Y+. By definition, Li∩ZΩ+ is ‖·‖
Ω-dense in Li. ThusWi∩Li∩ZΩ+ 6= ∅.
Let Qi =Wi ∩ZΩ and Lˆi = Li ∩ZΩ. Then, Qi is convex and relatively ‖ · ‖Ω-open
in ZΩ. Further, ∅ 6= Qi ∩ Lˆi ⊆ Pˆi(xi) and ‖ · ‖
Ω
Z-clPˆi(xi) ⊆ ‖ · ‖
Ω
Z-clQi, where
Pˆi(xi) = Pi(xi)∩ZΩ. By (A2), xi ∈ ‖ · ‖ΩZ-clPˆi(xi), and so xi ∈ ‖ · ‖
Ω
Z-clQi. For any
yi ∈ Qi ∩ Lˆi, since Vi(yi) > Vi(xi) and (x1, ..., xn, πˆ) is non-trivial Walrasian ex-
pectations quasi-equilibrium,
∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), yi(ω)〉 ≥
∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), xi(ω)〉. Since Ω is
finite, πˆ ∈ ((Z, ‖·‖aˆ)Ω)∗. By Lemma 3.4, there exist a πi1 ∈ ((Z, ‖·‖)
Ω)∗ and a linear
functional πi2 on (Z, ‖ · ‖)
Ω such that
∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
1(ω), xi(ω)〉 ≤
∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
1(ω), yi(ω)〉
for all yi ∈ Qi,
∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
2(ω), xi(ω)〉 ≤
∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
2(ω), yi(ω)〉 for all yi ∈ Lˆi, and
πˆ = πi1 + π
i
2. Since Lˆi is a cone,
∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
2(ω), xi(ω)〉 = 0. It follows that∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
2(ω), yi(ω)〉 ≥ 0 for all yi ∈ Lˆi. Hence, we have
(3.1)
∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), xi(ω)〉 =
∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
1(ω), xi(ω)〉,
(3.2)
∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), yi(ω)〉 ≥
∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
1(ω), yi(ω)〉 for all yi ∈ Lˆi.
Since (Z, ‖ · ‖aˆ) is a Banach lattice, (Z, ‖ · ‖aˆ)
∗ agrees with the order dual of Z.
In what follows, let (Z, ‖ · ‖aˆ)∗ be endowed with the dual ordering relative to the
ordering of Z. Since each yi ∈ Lˆi can be written as yi =
∑
S∈Fi
ySi 1S , where
ySi ∈ Z+ and S ∈ Fi, from (3.1) and (3.2), it can be verified that the following hold
for all S ∈ Fi:
(3.3)
∑
ω∈S π
i
1(ω) ≤
∑
ω∈S πˆ(ω),
(3.4)
∑
ω∈S〈πˆ(ω), xi(ω)〉 =
∑
ω∈S〈π
i
1(ω), xi(ω)〉.
Since (Z, ‖ · ‖) is a locally solid Riesz space, (Z, ‖ · ‖)∗ is an ideal in (Z, ‖ · ‖aˆ)∗.
Pick an arbitrary element S ∈ Fi. Since πˆ(ω) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ S, by (3.3) and Lemma
3.6, there is an element π˜i ∈ ((Z, ‖ ·‖)∗)S such that π˜i ≤ πˆ on S and
∑
ω∈S π˜
i(ω) =∑
ω∈S π
i
1(ω). We claim that for each ω ∈ S, 〈π˜
i(ω), xi(ω)〉 = 〈πˆ(ω), xi(ω)〉. To
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∑
R∈Fi
xRi 1R, where x
R
i ∈ Z+. By (3.4),∑
ω∈S
〈π˜i(ω), xi(ω)〉 =
〈∑
ω∈S
πi1(ω), x
S
i
〉
=
∑
ω∈S
〈πˆ(ω), xi(ω)〉.
Moreover, 〈π˜i(ω), xi(ω)〉 ≤ 〈πˆ(ω), xi(ω)〉 for each ω ∈ S. So, we must have
〈π˜i(ω), xi(ω)〉 = 〈πˆ(ω), xi(ω)〉 for each ω ∈ S, and the claim is verified. Since
Fi is a partition of Ω, there is an element π˜
i ∈ ((Z, ‖ · ‖)∗)Ω such that π˜i ≤ πˆ
on Ω and 〈π˜i(ω), xi(ω)〉 = 〈πˆ(ω), xi(ω)〉 for each ω ∈ Ω. Let N0 = N ∪ {0},
π˜0(ω) = 0 and a0(ω) = 0 for each ω ∈ Ω. Since (Z, ‖ · ‖)∗ is an ideal, for each
ω ∈ Ω, we can choose an element π¨(ω) ∈ (Z, ‖ · ‖)∗ such that π¨(ω) = sup{π˜i(ω) :
i ∈ N0}. Then π¨ ∈ ((Z, ‖ · ‖)∗)Ω, and π¨ ≤ πˆ. Define x0 ∈ ZΩ+ such that
x0(ω) =
∑
i∈N ai(ω) −
∑
i∈N xi(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. By the Riesz-Kantorovich
formulas, we obtain〈
π¨(ω),
∑
i∈N
ai(ω)
〉
= sup
{∑
i∈N0
〈π˜i(ω), yi〉 : yi ∈ Z+,
∑
i∈N0
yi =
∑
i∈N
ai(ω)
}
≥
∑
i∈N0
〈π˜i(ω), xi(ω)〉 =
∑
i∈N
〈π˜i(ω), xi(ω)〉
=
〈
πˆ(ω),
∑
i∈N
xi(ω)
〉
=
〈
πˆ(ω),
∑
i∈N
ai(ω)
〉
.
Applying π¨ ≤ πˆ, we have 〈π¨(ω),
∑
i∈N ai(ω)〉 = 〈πˆ(ω),
∑
i∈N ai(ω)〉 for each ω ∈ Ω.
Note that Z = L(
∑
i∈N ai(ω)) for each ω ∈ Ω. Let z ∈ Z+ be fixed. Choose
δ > 0 be such that z ≤ δ
∑
i∈N ai(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. Then, 〈π¨(ω), (δ
∑
i∈N ai(ω)−
z)〉 ≤ 〈πˆ(ω), (δ
∑
i∈N ai(ω) − z)〉, and so 〈π¨(ω), z〉 ≥ 〈πˆ(ω), z〉 for each ω ∈ Ω.
Consequently, π¨ ≥ πˆ and therefore, π¨ = πˆ. Thus, πˆ ∈ ((Z, ‖ · ‖)∗)Ω and (f, πˆ)
is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in Ec|Z . By the Hahn-
Banach theorem, we can choose a positive element π ∈ ((Y, ‖ · ‖)∗)Ω such that π is
an extension of πˆ. Since Lt ∩ ZΩ+ is ‖ · ‖
Ω-dense in Lt and Vt is ‖ · ‖Ω-continuous
for each t ∈ I, we deduce that
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), y(ω)〉 ≥
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), a(t, ω)〉 for all
y ∈ Lt satisfying Vt(y) > Vt(f(t, ·)). Further, if
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), a(t, ω)〉 > 0, then
‖ · ‖Ω-continuity of Vt implies that (f, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations
quasi-equilibrium of Ec. This completes the proof. 
Corollary 3.8. Let f be a feasible allocation such that f(t, ·) = xi for all t ∈ Ii and
i ∈ N . Under (A1)-(A4) and (A6)-(A8), f is a Walrasian expectations allocation if
and only if f is in the private core of Ec.
Now, we extend Theorem 3.7 to an asymmetric information economy with equal
treatment property whose commodity space is a Banach lattice having no quasi-
interior point in its positive cone. The following definition of strong ATY-properness
and the argument to get continuity of the equilibrium price in the next theorem
are similar to those in (A8′) and Theorem 3 of [20].
Definition 3.9. The relation Pi : Li ⇒ Li is called strongly ATY-proper at xi ∈ Li
if there is a convex subset P̂i(xi) of Y
Ω with non-empty ‖ · ‖Ω-interior such that
P̂i(xi) ∩ Li = Pi(xi) and (‖ · ‖Ω-intP̂i(xi)) ∩Li ∩ L(
∑
i∈N ai) 6= ∅.
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(A9) Strong properness. If (x1, ..., xn) is a privately Pareto optimal allocation in
E , then Pi is strongly ATY-proper at xi for each i ∈ N .
Theorem 3.10. Assume that E satisfies (A1)-(A3), (A′4), (A6) and (A9). Let f
be a feasible allocation in Ec such that f(t, ·) = xi for all t ∈ Ii and i ∈ N . If
f is in the private core of Ec, then (f, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations
quasi-equilibrium of Ec for some non-zero π : Ω→ Y ∗+.
Proof. Let f be in the private core of Ec. Let Z = L(aˆ), where aˆ is selected
according to (A6). Then, (X, ‖ · ‖) equipped with the ordering of (Y, ‖ · ‖) is a
Banach lattice, where X denotes the ‖ · ‖-closure of Z in Y . Note that for any
feasible allocation (y1, ..., yn) of E , yi(ω) belongs to Z+ for each i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω.
In particular, xi(ω) ∈ Z+ for each i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω. Clearly, for each i ∈ N and
ω ∈ Ω, Ui(ω, ·)|X satisfies (A1)-(A3). Suppose that (y1, ..., yn) is a privately Pareto
optimal allocation in the economy E|X , which is identical with E except for the
commodity space being X , each agent’s consumption set being X+ in each state of
nature ω ∈ Ω, and agent i’s ex ante expected utility being Vi|XΩ . Then (y1, ..., yn)
is privately Pareto optimal in E . Take P˜i(xi) = P̂i(xi) ∩XΩ for each i ∈ N , where
P̂i(xi) is chosen according to (A9). So, for each i ∈ N , P˜i(xi) is convex with non-
empty relative ‖ · ‖Ω-interior in XΩ. Let Lˆi = Li∩XΩ for each i ∈ N . By (A9), for
each i ∈ N , P˜i(xi) ∩ Lˆi = Pi(xi)|XΩ , where Pi(xi)|XΩ is the restriction of Pi(xi)
to XΩ and (intP˜i(xi)) ∩ Lˆi 6= ∅. Thus, (A1)-(A4), (A6) and (A8) are satisfied
for the economy E|X . Note that f is in the private core of Ec|X . By Theorem
3.7, there exists a non-zero positive element π ∈ (X∗)Ω such that (f, π) is a non-
trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in Ec|X . Therefore, by Proposition
2.3, (x1, ..., xn, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in E|X .
By the Hahn-Banach theorem, there is a non-zero positive element πˆ ∈ (Y ∗)Ω
which is an extension of π. Then (x1, ..., xn, πˆ) satisfies all conditions of non-
trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E except for the fact that if∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), ai(ω)〉 6= 0, then
∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), yi(ω)〉 >
∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), ai(ω)〉 for all yi ∈
Li satisfying Vi(yi) > Vi(xi). Clearly, this is true for all yi ∈ Lˆi.
Since (x1, ..., xn, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in
E|X , (x1, ..., xn) is privately Pareto optimal in E|X and hence, in E . Pick an
i ∈ N . By (A9), there is a convex and ‖ · ‖Ω-open subset Qi of Y Ω such that
∅ 6= Qi ∩ Lˆi ⊆ Pi(xi)|XΩ and ‖ · ‖
Ω-clPi(xi) ⊆ ‖ · ‖Ω-clQi. By (A2), xi ∈ ‖ · ‖Ω-
clPi(xi) and hence, xi ∈ ‖ · ‖Ω-clQi. For any yi ∈ Qi ∩ Lˆi, since Vi(yi) > Vi(xi)
and (x1, ..., xn, πˆ) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in E|X ,∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), yi(ω)〉 ≥
∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), xi(ω)〉. Note that Lˆi is convex, xi ∈ Lˆi and πˆ ∈
(Y Ω)∗. By an argument similar to that in Theorem 3.7, we can find an element πi1 ∈
(Y Ω)∗ such that
∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
1(ω), xi(ω)〉 =
∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), xi(ω)〉,
∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
1(ω), xi(ω)〉 ≤∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
1(ω), yi(ω)〉 for all yi ∈ Qi, and
∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
1(ω), yi(ω)〉 ≤
∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), yi(ω)〉
for all yi ∈ Lˆi. Since πi1 is ‖ · ‖
Ω-continuous and ‖ · ‖Ω-clPi(xi) ⊆ ‖ · ‖Ω-clQi,∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
1(ω), xi(ω)〉 ≤
∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
1(ω), yi(ω)〉 for all yi ∈ Pi(xi). Now, consider el-
ements πi⋆, π
⋆ ∈ (Y Ω)∗+ defined by 〈π
i
⋆, yi〉 =
∑
ω∈Ω〈π
i
1(ω), y
S
i (ω)〉 and 〈π
⋆, yi〉 =∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), y
S
i (ω)〉, where y
S
i =
1
|S|
∑
ω∈S yi(ω) for S ∈ Fi. Then π˜
i = πi⋆ + πˆ −
π⋆ ∈ (Y Ω)∗, and it can be verified that
(3.5)
∑
ω∈Ω〈π˜
i(ω), xi(ω)〉 =
∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), xi(ω)〉,
(3.6)
∑
ω∈Ω〈π˜
i(ω), xi(ω)〉 ≤
∑
ω∈Ω〈π˜
i(ω), yi(ω)〉 for all yi ∈ Pi(xi), and
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(3.7)
∑
ω∈Ω〈π˜
i(ω), z(ω)〉 ≤
∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), z(ω)〉 for all z ∈ X
Ω
+ .
Since Y is a locally solid Riesz space, Y ∗ is an ideal in the order dual of Y .
Let N0 = N ∪ {0}, π˜0(ω) = 0 and a0(ω) = 0 for each ω ∈ Ω. Define π¨ ∈
(Y ∗)Ω such that π¨(ω) = sup{π˜i(ω) : i ∈ N0} for each ω ∈ Ω, and x0 ∈ ZΩ+
such that x0(ω) =
∑
i∈N ai(ω) −
∑
i∈N xi(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. By the Riesz-
Kantorovich formulas and techniques similar to those in Theorem 3.7, we have〈
π¨(ω),
∑
i∈N ai(ω)
〉
≥
∑
i∈N
〈
π˜i(ω), xi(ω)
〉
for each ω ∈ Ω. Using (3.5), we can ob-
tain
∑
ω∈Ω
〈
π¨(ω),
∑
i∈N ai(ω)
〉
≥
∑
ω∈Ω
〈
πˆ(ω),
∑
i∈N ai(ω)
〉
. Moreover, the Riesz-
Kantorovich formulas and (3.7) imply
∑
ω∈Ω〈π¨(ω), z(ω)〉 ≤
∑
ω∈Ω〈πˆ(ω), z(ω)〉 for
all z ∈ XΩ+ . Since Z
Ω = L(
∑
i∈N ai), π¨ ≡ πˆ on Z
Ω, which can be combined
with (3.5) and (3.6) to derive
∑
ω∈Ω〈π¨(ω), xi(ω)〉 ≤
∑
ω∈Ω〈π¨(ω), yi(ω)〉 for all yi ∈
Pi(xi). It follows from (A2) and the fact that (x1, ..., xn, π¨) is a non-trivial Walrasian
expectations equilibrium in E|X ,
∑
ω∈Ω〈π¨(ω), xi(ω)〉 =
∑
ω∈Ω〈π¨(ω), ai(ω)〉. In case
that
∑
ω∈Ω〈π(ω), ai(ω)〉 6= 0, by (A1),
∑
ω∈Ω〈π¨(ω), ai(ω)〉 <
∑
ω∈Ω〈π¨(ω), yi(ω)〉
for all yi ∈ Pi(xi). Thus, (x1, ..., xn, π¨) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations
quasi-equilibrium in E . Hence, by Proposition 2.3, (f, π¨) is a non-trivial Walrasian
expectations quasi-equilibrium in Ec. 
Corollary 3.11. Let f be a feasible allocation such that f(t, ·) = xi for all t ∈
Ii and i ∈ N . Under (A1)-(A3), (A′4), (A6)-(A7) and (A9), f is a Walrasian
expectations allocation if and only if f is in the private core of Ec.
3.2. Blocking non-private core allocations. In this subsection, we give an exten-
sion of Vind’s theorem to an asymmetric information economy with a continuum
of agents having the equal treatment property and whose commodity space is a
Banach lattice, using the following lemma instead of any convexity theorem on the
commodity space.
Lemma 3.12. Assume that E satisfies (A1), (A3) and (A5). Let f be an allocation
such that f(t, ·) = fi for all t ∈ Ii and i ∈ N . If f is privately blocked in Ec, then
it is privately blocked by a coalition A via a function g such that g(t, ·) = gi ∈ Li if
t ∈ A∩ Ii and i ∈ N , and
∫
A
(a(t, ω)− g(t, ω))dµ(t) ≥ z for all ω ∈ Ω, where z > 0.
Proof. Since f is privately blocked in Ec, there are a coalition Aˆ ⊆ I and an
hˆ : Aˆ×Ω→ Y+ such that hˆ(t, ·) ∈ Lt and Vt(hˆ(t, ·)) > Vt(f(t, ·)) for all t ∈ Aˆ, and∫
Aˆ
hˆ(t, ω)dµ(t) ≤
∫
Aˆ
a(t, ω)dµ(t) for all ω ∈ Ω. Let Aˆi = Aˆ ∩ Ii for each i ∈ N ,
Nˆ = {i ∈ N : µ(Aˆi) 6= 0}, and A =
⋃
i∈Nˆ Aˆi. For each i ∈ Nˆ and ω ∈ Ω, put
hi(ω) =
1
µ(Aˆi)
∫
Aˆi
hˆ(t, ω)dµ(t). Then hi ∈ Li for all i ∈ Nˆ . Define h : A×Ω→ Y+ by
h(t, ω) = hi(ω) if t ∈ Aˆi. Clearly, for each ω ∈ Ω,
∫
A
h(t, ω)dµ(t) ≤
∫
A
a(t, ω)dµ(t),
equivalently,
∑
i∈Nˆ hi(ω)µ(Aˆi) ≤
∑
i∈Nˆ ai(ω)µ(Aˆi). Moreover, concavity of Vi im-
plies that Vi(h(t, ·)) > Vi(f(t, ·)) for all t ∈ Aˆi and all i ∈ Nˆ .
Choose a sequence {cm} ⊆ (0, 1) with cm → 0. For each i ∈ Nˆ and each
integer m ≥ 1, define a function gmi : Ω → Y+ by g
m
i (ω) = (1 − cm)hi(ω). Then
gmi ∈ Li for all i ∈ Nˆ . For each i ∈ Nˆ , since hi ∈ Pi(fi) and Pi(fi) is ‖ · ‖
Ω-open,
then gmi ∈ Pi(fi) whenever m is sufficiently large. If we choose such an m, then∑
i∈Nˆ g
m
i (ω)µ(Aˆi) ≤ (1− cm)
∑
i∈Nˆ ai(ω)µ(Aˆi), and∑
i∈Nˆ
ai(ω)µ(Aˆi)−
∑
i∈Nˆ
gmi (ω)µ(Aˆi) ≥ cm
∑
i∈Nˆ
ai(ω)µ(Aˆi).
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Let z = inf
{
cm
∑
i∈N̂ ai(ω)µ(Aˆi) : ω ∈ Ω
}
. By (A5), we have z > 0. If we define
g : A × Ω → Y+ such that g(t, ω) = gmi (ω) for all t ∈ Aˆi, then
∫
A
(a(t, ω) −
g(t, ω))dµ(t) ≥ z for all ω ∈ Ω and g(t, ·) ∈ Lt for all t ∈ A, which is required by
the lemma.  
Theorem 3.13. Assume that E satisfies (A1)-(A3) and (A5). Let f be a feasible
allocation in Ec such that f(t, ·) = fi for all t ∈ Ii and i ∈ N . If f is not in the
private core of Ec, then for any 0 < ǫ < 1, there is a coalition S with µ(S) = ǫ
privately blocking f .
Proof. Since f is not in the private core of Ec, by Lemma 3.12, there is a coalition
A ⊆ I that privately blocks f via a function g : A × Ω → Y+ such that g(t, ·) =
gi ∈ Li, if t ∈ Aˆi and
∫
A
(a(t, ·)− g(t, ·))dµ(t) ≥ z, where Aˆi = A ∩ Ii for all i ∈ N .
Choose a δ ∈ (0, 1). Since µ is atomless, there is Ei ⊆ Aˆi such that µ(Ei) = δµ(Aˆi).
Moreover, for any t ∈ Aˆi, a(t, ·)− g(t, ·) = ai − gi. Hence,∫
Ei
(a(t, ·)− g(t, ·))dµ(t) = (ai − gi)δµ(Aˆi) = δ
∫
Aˆi
(a(t, ·) − g(t, ·))dµ(t).
Take E =
⋃
i∈Nˆ Ei. Then,
∫
E
(a(t, ·)− g(t, ·))dµ(t) = δ
∫
A
(a(t, ·)− g(t, ·))dµ(t), and
µ(E) = δµ(A). Since δ
∫
A
(a(t, ·) − g(t, ·))dµ(t) > 0 for any 0 < δ < 1, there is a
coalition E ⊆ A with µ(E) = δµ(A) privately blocking f via g. This proves the
theorem for ǫ ≤ µ(A).
If µ(A) = 1, the proof has been completed. Otherwise, µ(I \ A) > 0, and for
any given 0 < ǫ < 1, we define a function gǫ : A × Ω → Y+ such that gǫ(t, ω) =
ǫg(t, ǫ) + (1 − ǫ)f(t, ω). Then, gǫ(t, ·) ∈ Lt for all t ∈ A. By concavity of Vt,
we have Vt(gǫ(t, ·)) > Vt(f(t, ·)) for all t ∈ A. Let Cˆ = I \ A, Ci = Cˆ ∩ Ii,
Nˆ1 = {i ∈ N : µ(Ci) > 0} and C =
⋃
i∈Nˆ1
Ci. Then µ(Cˆ) = µ(C). If i ∈ Nˆ1,
since µ is atomless, there is Bi ⊆ Ci such that µ(Bi) = (1 − ǫ)µ(Ci). Moreover,
a(t, ·)− f(t, ·) = ai − fi for any t ∈ Ci. Hence∫
Bi
(a(t, ·)− f(t, ·))dµ(t) = (1 − ǫ)
∫
Ci
(a(t, ·)− f(t, ·))dµ(t).
Let B =
⋃
i∈Nˆ1
Bi. Then µ(B) = (1− ǫ)µ(I \A) and∫
B
(a(t, ·)− f(t, ·))dµ(t) = (1− ǫ)
∫
I\A
(a(t, ·)− f(t, ·))dµ(t).
Define a consumption bundle hǫ : B×Ω→ Y+ by hǫ(t, ω) = f(t, ω)+
ǫµ(A)
µ(B) z. Since
f(t, ·) ∈ Lt and z is constant, hǫ(t, ·) ∈ Lt for all t ∈ B. By monotonicity of Vt,
Vt(hǫ(t, ·)) > Vt(f(t, ·)) for all t ∈ B.
Let S = A ∪ B. Then, µ(S) = µ(A) + (1 − ǫ)µ(I \ A). Now we show that
S privately blocks f . Define a consumption bundle yǫ : S × Ω → Y+ such that
yǫ(t, ω) = gǫ(t, ω) if (t, ω) ∈ A × Ω, and yǫ(t, ω) = hǫ(t, ω), if (t, ω) ∈ B × Ω.
Clearly, yǫ(t, ·) ∈ Lt and Vt(yǫ(t, ·)) > Vt(f(t, ·)) for all t ∈ S. It remains to verify
that yǫ is feasible for S. Since
∫
A
(a(t, ·)− g(t, ·))dµ(t) ≥ z, we have∫
S
(a(t, ·)− yǫ(t, ·))dµ(t) ≥ ǫz + (1− ǫ)
∫
A
(a(t, ·)− f(t, ·))dµ(t)
+
∫
B
(a(t, ·)− f(t, ·))dµ(t) − ǫµ(A)z.
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On the other hand, ǫz − ǫµ(A)z = ǫµ(I \A)z > 0, and∫
B
(a(t, ·)− f(t, ·))dµ(t) = (1− ǫ)
∫
I\A
(a(t, ·)− f(t, ·))dµ(t).
Combining the previous few inequalities and equalities, we obtain∫
S
(a(t, ·) − yǫ(t, ·))dµ(t) > (1 − ǫ)
∫
I
(a(t, ·)− f(t, ·))dµ(t) ≥ 0,
which verifies that S privately blocks f via yǫ. 
4. Characterizations of Walrasian expectations equilibrium
In this section, we provide characterizations of Walrasian expectations equilib-
rium in terms of the private blocking power of the grand coalition. The following
concepts for asymmetric information economies in [15] will be needed.
Definition 4.1. A coalition S ⊆ N privately blocks an allocation x of E in the sense
of Aubin via y = (yi)i∈S if for all i ∈ S, there is αi ∈ (0, 1] such that Vi(yi) > Vi(xi)
and
∑
i∈S αiyi ≤
∑
i∈S αiai. The Aubin private core of E is the set of all feasible
allocations which cannot be blocked by any coalition in the sense of Aubin, and an
allocation x in E is called an Aubin dominated allocation if x is privately blocked
by the grand coalition in the sense of Aubin.
The proof of our first theorem in this section is similar to that Theorem 4.2 in
[15].
Theorem 4.2. Assume that E satisfies (A1)-(A2), (A4)-(A5) and (A7), and its
commodity space has an interior point in its positive cone. Then, a feasible al-
location x in E is a Walrasian expectations allocation if and only if x is Aubin
non-dominated.
Remark 4.3 ([15]). The participation of an agent i in the grand coalition of E
is said to be close to complete if α˜i > 1 − δ for sufficiently small δ > 0. Indeed,
Theorem 4.2 shows that the participation of each agent can be chosen to be close to
complete. To see this, for any given 0 < δ < 1, by Theorem 3.13, we can choose a
privately blocking coalition S such that µ(S) > 1− δ
n
. Hence, α˜i = nµ(Si) > 1− δ
for all i ∈ N . 
Remark 4.4. Conclusions of Theorem 4.2 and Remark 4.3 are also true under
(A1)-(A8), or A1)-(A3), (A5)-(A7) and (A9)), respectively. 
The proof of our next theorem is similar to that of Theorem 4.1 in [14, 15]. For
an allocation x = (x1, ..., xn) in E and a vector r = (r1, ..., rn) ∈ [0, 1]n, consider an
asymmetric information economy E(r, x) which is identical with E except for the
random initial endowment of each agent i being ai(ri, xi) = riai + (1− ri)xi.
Theorem 4.5. Assume that E satisfies (A1)-(A2), (A4)-(A5) and (A7), and its
commodity space has an interior point in its positive cone. Then, a feasible allo-
cation x in E is a Walrasian expectations allocation if and only if x is privately
non-dominated in E(r, x) for any r ∈ [0, 1]n.
Remark 4.6 ([15]). Note that for each agent i ∈ N , r˜i can be selected arbitrarily
close to 1. To see this, for any given 0 < δ < 1, by Theorem 3.13, we can choose a
privately blocking coalition S such that µ(S) > 1− δ
n
. Hence, r˜i = nµ(Si) > 1− δ
for all i ∈ N . 
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Remark 4.7. Conclusion of Theorem 4.5 is also true under (A1)-(A8), or A1)-(A3),
(A5)-(A7) and (A9)), respectively. The same is true for Remark 4.6. 
Remark 4.8 ([15]). Theorem 4.5 and the first part of the Remark 4.7 not only pro-
vide characterizations of Walrasian expectations allocation in terms of veto power
of the grand coalition but also implies two welfare theorems as particular cases. If
x is a Walrasian expectations allocation in E , then x is a privately Pareto optimal
allocation in E and any E(r, x) with r ∈ [0, 1]n. Thus, the first welfare theorem is
an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.5 and the first part of Remark 4.7.
Observe that if x is privately Pareto optimal in E , then x is also privately Pareto
optimal in E(0, x). If we choose x = a, then all economies E(r, x) are equal to E(0, x)
and x is not privately blocked by the grand coalition. If inf{xi(ω) : ω ∈ Ω} > 0 for
all i ∈ N , Theorem 4.5 and the first part of Remark 4.7 implies that x is a Walrasian
expectations allocation, which is exactly the second welfare theorem. 
We conclude this section with some basic examples of Banach lattices and a
chart containing a summary where these Banach lattices are applied: (i) Rn: the
Euclidean space; (ii) ℓ∞: the space of real bounded sequence with the supremum
norm; (iii) L∞(Ω,Σ, µ): the space of essentially bounded, measurable functions
on a measure space (Ω,Σ, µ) with the essential supremum norm; (iv) C(K): the
space of real valued continuous functions on a compact Hausdorff space K with
the supremum norm; (v) ℓp: the space of real sequences x = {xn} with the norm
‖x‖p = (
∑∞
n=1 |xn|
p)
1
p < ∞ , where 1 ≤ p < ∞; (vi) Lp(Ω,Σ, µ): the space
of measurable functions f on the measure space (Ω,Σ, µ) with the norm ‖f‖p =(∫
Ω |f(ω)|
pdµ(ω)
) 1
p <∞, where 1 ≤ p <∞; (vii)M(K): the space of regular Borel
measures on a compact Hausdorff space K with the total variation norm.
Y
Y+ having Y+ having Applications
interior points quasi-interior points
R
n + +
Theorems
1, 4, 5, 6
ℓ∞ + +
Theorems
1, 4, 5, 6
L∞(Ω,Σ, µ) + +
Theorems
1, 4, 5, 6
C(K) + +
Theorems
1, 4, 5, 6
ℓp - +
Theorems 2, 4
(1 ≤ p <∞) Remarks 4, 6
Lp(Ω,Σ, µ) - +
Theorems 2, 4
(1 ≤ p <∞) Remarks 4, 6
M(K)
- -
Theorems 3, 4
(K uncountable) Remarks 4, 6
Appendix
(A.1) Results on economies with arbitrary probability spaces of states
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In this section, we apply results established in previous sections, particularly The-
orem 3.13, to characterize the ex-post core and private core of an economy with an
arbitrary probability space of states of nature.
Let E˜ be a discrete economy identical with E except for the space of states of
nature being a probability measure space (Ω,Σ, ν), where Ω is an (infinite) arbitrary
set of states of nature, the σ-algebra Σ denotes the set of events and the probability
measure ν denotes the common prior of each agent i ∈ N . For any xi : Ω → Y+,
the ex ante expected utility of agent i is given by Vi(xi) =
∫
Ω
Ui(ω, xi(ω))ν(dω).
The concepts of an assignment and an allocation in E˜ are defined in the same
way as that in E . Further, an allocation (assignment) x is said to be feasible if∑n
i=1 xi(ω) ≤
∑n
i=1 ai(ω) for almost all ω ∈ Ω. A feasible assignment x of E is
called fine non-dominated (resp. weak fine non-dominated) if for all i ∈ N , xi
is Fi-measurable (resp.
∨
i∈N Fi-measurable) and there is no feasible assignment
y = (y1, ..., yn) such that yi is
∨
i∈N Fi-measurable and Vi(yi) > Vi(xi) for all i ∈ N .
A coalition is a non-empty subset S of N . A coalition S ⊆ N privately blocks an
allocation x in E˜ if there exists y = (yi)i∈S such that yi ∈ Li and Vi(yi) > Vi(xi)
for all i ∈ S, and
∑
i∈S yi(ω) ≤
∑
i∈S ai(ω) for almost all ω ∈ Ω. The private
core of the economy E˜ is the set of all feasible allocations which are not privately
blocked by any coalition. A feasible allocation x of E˜ is in the ex-post core [8] of
E˜ if there are no coalition S ⊆ N , y = (yi)i∈S , and Ω0 ∈ Σ such that ν(Ω0) > 0,∑
i∈S yi(ω) ≤
∑
i∈S ai(ω) for almost all ω ∈ Ω0, and Ui(ω, yi(ω)) > Ui(ω, xi(ω))
for all i ∈ S and for almost all ω ∈ Ω0.
Assume that E˜c is a continuum economy associated with E˜ . Since Ft = Fi for
each agent t ∈ Ii, infinitely many states can be taken in E˜c even agents share
their information. An assignment in E˜c is a function f : I × Ω → Y+ such that
f(·, ω) ∈ L1(µ, Y+) for almost all ω ∈ Ω. Let Lt = Li for all t ∈ Ii and i ∈ N . An
assignment f in E˜c is called an allocation if f(t, ·) ∈ Lt for almost all t ∈ I. An
allocation f in E˜c is feasible if
∫
I
f(t, ω)dµ(t) ≤
∫
I
a(t, ω)dµ(t) for almost all ω ∈ Ω.
A coalition S privately blocks an allocation f in E˜c if there is g : S × Ω→ Y+ such
that g(t, ·) ∈ Lt and Vt(g(t, ·)) > Vt(f(t, ·)) for all t ∈ S, and
∫
S
g(t, ω)dµ(t) ≤∫
S
a(t, ω)dµ(t) for almost all ω ∈ Ω. The private core of E˜c is the set of feasible
allocations not privately blocked by any coalition. A feasible allocation f of E˜c is
in the ex-post core of E˜c if there are no coalition S ⊆ I, function g : S × Ω → Y+,
and Ω0 ∈ Σ satisfying ν(Ω0) > 0,
∫
S
g(t, ω)dµ(t) ≤
∫
S
a(t, ω)dµ(t) for almost all
ω ∈ Ω0, Ut(ω, g(t, ω)) > Ut(ω, f(t, ω)) for all t ∈ S and for almost all ω ∈ Ω0.
Next, we establish a relation between the set of all fine non-dominated alloca-
tions and the ex-post core. This result is new even for finite dimensional commodity
space. For an ω ∈ Ω, let E˜c(ω) denote the full information economy whose com-
modity space being Y+, the set of agents being I, the utility function and initial
endowment of agent t being Ut(ω, ·) and a(t, ω) respectively.
Theorem 4.9. Assume that E˜ satisfies (A1)-(A3) and (A5). Let x be a feasible
allocation of E˜. If x is fine non-dominated in E˜(r, x) for any r ∈ [0, 1]n, then x is
in the ex-post core of E˜ .
Proof. Suppose that x is not in the ex-post core of E˜ . Then, the simple function f
on I, defined by f(t, ·) = xi for all t ∈ Ii and i ∈ N , is not in the ex-post core of E˜c.
Thus, there is Ω0 ∈ Σ with ν(Ω0) > 0 such that f(·, ω) is feasible and not in the
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core of E˜c(ω) for almost all ω ∈ Ω0. Let A ∈
∨
i∈N Fi with ν(Ω0∩A) 6= 0. Applying
Theorem 3.13 for each E˜c(ω) and the fact that f(t, ·) and a(t, ·) are constant on
Ω0 ∩ A for all t ∈ I, there exist a coalition SA ⊆ I with µ(SA) > 1 −
1
n
, and a
function gA : SA × (Ω0 ∩A)→ Y+ such that
(A.1.1) gA(t, ·) ∈ Lt for all t ∈ SA and
∫
SA
gA(t, ω)dµ(t) ≤
∫
SA
a(t, ω)dµ(t) for
almost all ω ∈ Ω0 ∩ A,
(A.1.2) Ut(ω, g
A(t, ω)) > Ut(ω, f(t, ω)) for all t ∈ SA and for almost all ω ∈ Ω0∩A.
Pick an ω0 ∈ Ω0∩A such that both (A.1.1) and (A.1.2) hold. Now, define a function
hA : SA × A → Y+ such that hA(t, ω) = gA(t, ω0) for all (t, ω) ∈ SA × A. Then,
hA(t, ·) is
∨n
i=1 Fi-measurable for all t ∈ S
A and hA(·, ω) is Bochner integrable for
all ω ∈ A. Since a(t, ·) ∈ Li for all t ∈ Ii and i ∈ N , a(·, ω) = a(·, ω′) for all
ω, ω′ ∈ A. Hence,
∫
SA
hA(t, ω)dµ(t) ≤
∫
SA
a(t, ω)dµ(t) for all ω ∈ A.
Let SAi = S
A ∩ Ii and rAi = nµ(S
A
i ) for all i ∈ N . Since µ(S
A) > 1 − 1
n
,
we have rAi > 0 for all i ∈ N . Now for all i ∈ N , y
A
i =
1
µ(SA
i
)
∫
SA
i
hA(t, ·)dµ(t) is∨n
i=1 Fi-measurable. By (A3), Ui(ω, y
A
i (ω)) > Ui(ω, xi(ω)) for all i ∈ N and ω ∈ A.
Further, following from
∑
i∈N µ(S
A
i )y
A
i ≤
∑
i∈N µ(S
A
i )ai, we have
∑
i∈N r
A
i y
A
i ≤∑
i∈N r
A
i ai. If we put z
A
i = r
A
i y
A
i + (1 − r
A
i )xi for all i ∈ N , then z
A
i is
∨n
i=1 Fi-
measurable and∑
i∈N
zAi ≤
∑
i∈N
{rAi ai + (1− r
A
i )xi} =
∑
i∈N
ai(r
A
i , xi).
By (A3) again, Ui(ω, z
A
i (ω)) > Ui(ω, xi(ω)) for all i ∈ N and ω ∈ A. Now for each
i ∈ N , the assignment bi : Ω → Y+ defined by bi(ω) = zAi if ω ∈ A and bi(ω) = xi
if ω 6∈ A, is
∨n
i=1 Fi-measurable, and b = (b1, ..., bn) is feasible in E˜(r
A, x), where
rA = (rA1 , ..., r
A
n ). Since
Vi(bi) >
∫
A
Ui(ω, xi(ω))ν(dω) +
∫
Ω\A
Ui(ω, xi(ω))ν(dω) = Vi(xi),
x is fine dominated by b in E˜(rA, x). The proof is completed. 
We conclude this section with a characterization of the private core of E˜ by the
set of all privately non-dominated allocations of E˜(r, x), which is new even for finite
dimensional commodity space.
Theorem 4.10. Assume that E˜ satisfies (A1)-(A3) and (A5). Then x is in the
private core of E˜ if and only if x is a privately non-dominated allocation in E˜(r, x)
for any r ∈ [0, 1]n.
Proof. Let x be in the private core of E˜ . Suppose that x is privately dominated in
E˜(r, x) for some r = (r1, ..., rn) ∈ [0, 1]n. Then, there is an allocation (y1, ..., yn)
such that Vi(yi) > Vi(xi) for each i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N yi(ω) ≤
∑
i∈N{riai(ω) + (1 −
ri)xi(ω)} for almost all ω ∈ Ω. Since x is feasible,
∑
i∈N yi(ω) ≤
∑
i∈N ai(ω) for
almost all ω ∈ Ω, a contradiction with the fact that x is in the private core of E˜ .
Conversely, let x be a privately non-dominated allocation in E˜(r, x) for any r ∈
[0, 1]n. Assume that x is not in the private core of E˜ . Then, the simple function f
on I is not in the private core of E˜c Note that the conclusion of Theorem 3.13 is
true in E˜c under (A1)-(A3) and (A5). Then, the conclusion can be derived by an
argument similar to that in Theorem 4.5. 
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Let E˜(s) be a symmetric information economy which is identical with E˜ except
for the information for each agent being Fsi =
∨
i∈N Fi.
Corollary 4.11. Assume that E˜ satisfies (A1)-(A3) and (A5). Then, a feasible
allocation x is weak fine dominated in E(r, x) for any r ∈ [0, 1]n if only if x is in
the private core of E˜(s).
Remark 4.12. In Section 4, we have applied the equivalence theorems and the
Vind’s type theorem in Section 3 to establish characterizations of Walrasian expec-
tations allocations for an asymmetric economy with finitely many states of nature.
The perspective reader may wonder why such characterizations are not discussed in
the scenario where infinitely many states of nature are considered. Although Vind’s
theorem is valid for an economy with an arbitrary probability space of states of na-
ture, these equivalence theorem are only valid for the scenario where finitely many
states of nature are considered. So, the techniques employed in Section 4 do not
allow us to establish similar results for characterizing Walrasian expectations allo-
cations in the scenario with infinitely many states of nature. However, the difficulty
may be overcome by applying new and different techniques, which could be done
in the future work. 
(A.2) Discussion on ATY-properness
In this subsection, we discuss about the ATY-properness of utility functions. Let
Ai(xi) = {yi ∈ Li : Ui(ω, yi(ω)) > Ui(ω, xi(ω)) for each ω ∈ Ω} for all xi ∈ Li.
So, Ai(xi) ⊆ Pi(xi). By (A2), xi ∈ clAi(xi). Then, it is clear from the proof of
Theorem 3.7 that we used the following fact from (A8):
(A.2.1) If x is a privately Pareto optimal allocation, then there is a convex and
‖ · ‖Ω-open subset Wi of Y Ω such that ∅ 6= Wi ∩ Li ⊆ Ai(xi) and ‖ · ‖Ω-
clAi(xi) ⊆ ‖ · ‖Ω-clWi for each i ∈ N .
We now introduce the definition of ATY-properness of a random utility function
similar to that of preference relation.
Definition 4.13. For ω ∈ Ω, the utility function Ui(ω, ·) is called ATY-proper at
x ∈ Y+ if there exists a convex subset A˜i(ω, x) of Y with non-empty ‖ · ‖-interior
such that A˜i(ω, x) ∩ Y+ = Ai(ω, x) and (intA˜i(ω, x))∩Y+ 6= ∅, where Ai(ω, x) =
{y ∈ Y+ : Ui(ω, y) > Ui(ω, x)}.
We need the following assumptions of agents’ utility functions.
(A′8) State Properness. If (xi)i∈N is a privately Pareto optimal allocation in E ,
then Ui(ω, ·) is ATY-proper at xi(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ N .
(A′′8 ) Measurability. For each i ∈ N and x ∈ Y+, Ui(·, x) is Fi-measurable.
Replacing (A8) with (A
′
8) and (A
′′
8 ), we can derive (A.2.1) by takingWi =
∏
ω∈Ω
intA˜i(ω, xi(ω)) for each i ∈ N , where A˜i(ω, xi(ω)) = A˜i(ω′, xi(ω′)) if ω, ω′ ∈ R ∈
Fi. Alternatively, similar to the v-properness of the preference relation in [2], one
can assume in the definition of ATY-properness of Ui(ω, ·) that xi(ω) + yi(ω) ∈
intA˜i(ω, xi(ω)) for some yi ∈ Li in the place of (intA˜i(ω, x))∩Y+ 6= ∅ and we
obtain (A.2.1) by using (A′8) only. Analogous assumptions are not sufficient for
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(A9), because the preference Pi(xi) coming from expected utility plays an important
role. However, (A8) and (A9) directly follow from the v-properness of the preference
relation in a full information economy. To see this, consider a correspondence Si :
Y Ω+ ⇒ Y
Ω
+ defined by Si(x) = {y ∈ Y
Ω
+ : Vi(y) > Vi(x)} for i ∈ N . By (A3), Si(xi)
is convex. Choose a non-zero element vi ∈ Li. By the vi-properness assumption,
there is a convex-valued correspondence S˜i : Y
Ω
+ ⇒ Y
Ω such that for each x ∈ Y Ω+
the following hold: (i) x + vi ∈ ‖ · ‖Ω-intS˜i(x); and (ii) S˜i(x) ∩ Y Ω+ = Si(x). Note
that if x ∈ Li, then we have x+ vi ∈ (‖ · ‖Ω-intS˜i(x)) ∩ Li and S˜i(x) ∩ Li = Pi(x),
and so Pi is ATY-proper. Applying a similar argument, one can derive the strong
ATY-proper preference relation by taking vi ∈ Li ∩ L(
∑
i∈N ai) for all i ∈ N .
(A.3) Mathematical preliminaries
Given a real vector space X , a function ‖ · ‖ : X → [0,∞) satisfying (i) ‖x‖ ≥ 0
for all x ∈ X and ‖x‖ = 0 if and only if x = 0; (ii) ‖αx‖ = |α|‖x‖ for all x ∈ X
and α ∈ R; (iii) ‖x + y‖ ≤ ‖x‖ + ‖y‖ for all x, y ∈ X , is called a norm on X ,
and (X, ‖ · ‖) is called a normed space. If A and Z are subsets of a normed space
(X, ‖ · ‖) with A ⊆ Z, the closure and the interior of A in the relative topology
generated by norm on Z are denoted by ‖ · ‖Z-clA and ‖ · ‖Z-intA respectively.
When Z = X , without confusion, we simply write ‖ · ‖-clA and ‖ · ‖-intA instead.
In addition, if A is convex with ‖ · ‖-intA 6= ∅, then ‖ · ‖-clA = ‖ · ‖-cl(‖ · ‖-intA).
If X is a real vector space and ≤ is a partial order on X , then the pair (X,≤) is
called an ordered vector space if for any x, y, z ∈ X and any positive real number
α, x ≥ y implies that αx + z ≥ αy + z. Recall that a Riesz space is an ordered
vector space that is also a lattice, that is, every pair of elements x, y ∈ X has a
supremum x ∨ y and an infimum x ∧ y. For any element x of a Riesz space, |x|
stands for the absolute value of x and is expressed in the form |x| = x++x−, where
x+ = x ∨ 0 and x− = (−x) ∨ 0 are positive and negative parts of x respectively.
Note that x = x+ − x− and x+ ∧ x− = 0. An element x ∈ X is called a positive
element of X if x ≥ 0 and X+ = {x ∈ X : x ≥ 0}. We write x > 0, if x ∈ X+ and
x 6= 0. For two points x, y ∈ Y , x > y means x − y > 0. If x ≤ y in X , then [x, y]
denotes the order interval {z ∈ X : x ≤ z ≤ y}. A subset A of X is called order
bounded if A ⊆ [x, y] for some x, y ∈ X . A norm is called a lattice norm if |x| < |y|
implies ‖x‖ ≤ ‖y‖. A normed Riesz space is a Riesz space with a lattice norm. A
complete normed Riesz space is called a Banach lattice. A lattice norm on a Riesz
space is an M -norm if ‖x∨ y‖ = max{‖x‖, ‖y‖} for any x, y ≥ 0. An M -space is a
normed Riesz space with an M -norm. A norm complete M -space is an AM -space.
A subset A of a Riesz space is called solid if |x| < |y| and y ∈ A imply x ∈ A. A
solid vector subspace of a Riesz space is called an ideal. A pair (X, τ) is called a
locally solid Riesz space if X is a Riesz space and τ is a linear topology on X such
that τ has a basis at zero consisting of solid neighborhoods.
A linear functional f : X → R on a Riesz space X is called ordered bounded if
f(A) is bounded in R for any order bounded subset A of X . Recall that an order
dual X˜ of a Riesz space X is an ordered vector space consisting of all order bounded
linear functionals onX under the usual algebraic operations, and the ordering f ≤ g
if 〈f, x〉 ≤ 〈g, x〉 for all x ∈ X+. If (X, ‖ · ‖) is a normed space, its norm dual X∗ is
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the set of continuous linear functionals on X equipped with the norm ‖ · ‖ defined
by ‖f‖ = sup{|〈f, x〉| : x ∈ X, ‖x‖ ≤ 1}. If (X, ‖ · ‖) is a locally solid Riesz space,
X∗ is an ideal in X˜. If (X, ‖ ·‖) is a Banach lattice, then X∗ = X˜ and ‖ ·‖-topology
is the finest locally solid topology on X . The order dual X˜ of any Riesz space X is
an order complete Riesz space, and its lattice operations are given by
〈f ∨ g, x〉 = sup{〈f, y〉+ 〈g, z〉 : y, z ∈ X+ and y + z = x}
and
〈f ∧ g, x〉 = inf{〈f, y〉+ 〈g, z〉 : y, z ∈ X+ and y + z = x}
for all f, g ∈ X˜, and x ∈ X+. These two equalities are called the Riesz-Kantorovich
formulas. The Hahn-Banach Theorem claims that a continuous linear functional
defined on a subspace of a normed space can be extended to a continuous linear
functional on the entire space, with its norm preserved. In addition, the separation
theorem says for any two disjoint (non-empty) convex subsets A and B in a Banach
lattice (X, ‖·‖), if either A or B has non-empty interior, then there exists a non-zero
f ∈ X∗ that separates A and B.
Let X be a Banach lattice. If Ω is a finite set, then XΩ is endowed with point-
wise algebraic operations, the pointwise order and the product norm of X is a
Banach lattice. If x ∈ (X, ‖ · ‖)Ω (i.e., XΩ equipped with the ‖ · ‖Ω-topology)
and g ∈ ((X, ‖ · ‖)Ω)∗, then there is an element f ∈ ((X, ‖ · ‖)∗)Ω such that
〈g, x〉 =
∑
ω∈Ω〈f(ω), x(ω)〉 and vise-versa. For any x ∈ X , the principal ideal
generated by x is defined by L(x) = {y ∈ X : |y| ≤ n|x| for some n ∈ N}. A point
x ∈ X+ is called an order unit of X if L(x) = X , and a quasi-interior point of
X+ if L(x) is norm dense in X (equivalently, 〈f, x〉 > 0 for all f ∈ X∗+ \ {0}).
If x is a quasi-interior point of X+, we write x ≫ 0. An order unit is a quasi-
interior point, but the converse is not true in general. Note that L(x) with the
norm ‖y‖xˆ = inf{λ > 0 : |y| < λ|x|} is an AM-space with x as an order unit.
Let (Ω,Σ, µ) be a measure space and X a Banach lattice. A function φ : Ω→ X
that assumes only a finite number of values, say x1, ..., xn, is called a simple function
if Ai = φ
−1({xi}) ∈ Σ for each i. As usual, the formula φ =
∑n
i=1 xi1
Ai is the
standard representation of φ, where
1Ai(t) =
{
1, if t ∈ Ai;
0, otherwise,
is called the characteristic function of Ai on Ω. Moreover, we say that a function
f : Ω→ X is µ-measurable if there exists a sequence of simple functions {φn : n ≥
1} such that lim ‖f(t)− φn(t)‖ = 0 for almost all t ∈ Ω. A µ-measurable function
f : Ω → X is said to be Bochner integrable if there exists a sequence of simple
functions {φn : n ≥ 1} such that the real measurable function ‖f(t) − φn(t)‖ is
Lebesgue integrable for each n and lim
∫
Ω ‖f(t) − φn(t)‖dµ(t) = 0. In this case,
for each E ∈ Σ, the Bochner integral of f over E is defined by
∫
E
f(t)µ(t) =
lim
∫
E
φn(t)dµ(t), where the last limit is in the norm topology on X .
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